State v. Navarrette Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38040 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-12-2011
State v. Navarrette Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38040
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Navarrette Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38040" (2011). Not Reported. 59.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/59
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 










) _____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE DARLA S. WILLIAMSON 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




SPENCER J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case ......................................................................................... 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ............................................ 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
I. Navarrete Has Failed To Show That The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied His 
Motion For A Continuance Of The Trial. ..................................... 5 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 6 
C. Navarrete Has Failed To Show That The 
District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion To Continue His Jury Trial ............... 6 
II. Navarrete Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Erred By Denying His Motion For Mistrial. ................................ 12 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 12 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... 15 
C. The District Court Properly Denied 
Navarrete's Motion for A Mistrial. ................................... 15 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 22 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) ......................................................................... 16 
State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 136 P.3d 350 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................... 12 
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................ 15 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P .3d 1203 (2009) .............................................. 6 
State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187,646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982) ............................... 16 
State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 891 P.2d 1054 (Ct. App. 1995) ................................. 7 
State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 760 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1988) .............................. 7 
State v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 932 P.2d 881 (1997) ........................................... 6, 12 
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................. 10 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ........................................... 16 
State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 927 P.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1996) ............................ 6, 7 
State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200,485 P.2d 144 (1971) .................................................... 6 
State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 826, 693 P .2d 472 (Ct. App. 1984) ................................... 7 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 119 P.3d 637 (Ct. App. 2004) ................................. 10 
State v. McClurg, 50 Idaho 762, 300 P. 898 (1931) ................................................... 7 
State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) ............................................... 7 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998) .............................................. 16 
Statev. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,233 P.3d 52 (2010) ............................................ 6, 11 
State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 981 P.2d 738 (1999) .................................................. 6 
State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 619 P.2d 787 (1980) ............................................. 17 
ii 
State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1998) ........................... 15, 21 
State v. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 869 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................. 16 
State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 38 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................. 16 
State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32 P .3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................... 16 
State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho 716, 864 P.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1993) ...................... 7, 11 
RULES 
I.C.R. 52 ................................................................................................................... 16 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Carlos Malvin Navarrete appeals from his convictions for murder in the 
second degree and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Carlos Navarrete and Irving Romero had been having problems getting along 
with each other. (Tr., p.659, Ls.6-7; p.883, Ls.16-25.) 1 Just before noon on October 
19, 2009, Navarrete, Jessie Salinas, and Mike Stolp drove together in a truck to 
Holly Petersen's trailer in a Garden City mobile home park. (Tr., p.641, L.1 - p.642, 
L.12; p.653, L.4 - p.655, L.1 O; p.903, L.15 - p.904, L.16.) Salinas got a gun from 
the truck and handed it to Navarrete, who placed it in his waistband, and the three 
men went inside the trailer where Romero and a woman were sleeping in the back 
bedroom. (Tr., p.648, Ls.5-9; p.664, Ls.2-17; p.665, Ls.7-15; p.1508, Ls.20-22.) 
Navarrete asked Holly, who was "freaking out," whether there were any kids present, 
and she told him her kids were there. (Tr., p.672, L.2 - p.673, L.18.) However, 
when Navarrete asked another woman, Elizabeth ("Liz") Chinea, whether any kids 
were there, she told him "no." (Tr., p.673, Ls.20-21.) 
Salinas went back outside and talked to Liz and Holly in the driveway for a 
few minutes, and when he started to walk toward the front doors (main door and 
screen door), the doors slammed open and Romero ran outside, hitting Salinas with 
1 "Tr." refers to the trial transcript. Citations to other transcripts will be identified by 
the date of the hearing transcribed. 
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his shoulder; at that moment, Navarrete, who was following Romero from inside the 
trailer, shot Romero in the back, killing him. (Tr., p.533, Ls.19-21; p.676, L.13 -
p.677, L.25; p.753, L.3 - p.754, L.8; p.927, L.14 - p.929, L.8; p.1509, L.6 - p.1510, 
L. 1 5; p. 1 511 , Ls. 1 2-1 8.) 
Navarrete was charged with murder in the second degree and use of a 
firearm during the commission of a crime. (R., pp.90-91.) Three days before 
Navarrete's jury trial was scheduled to begin, his attorneys verbally requested a 
continuance on the ground that the defense's alibi witness, Anthony Henderson, had 
moved to California and refused to return phone calls, and "the only thing [the 
defense] can do is use the statutory means of subpoenaing him out of state." 
(6/25/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-16; p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.23.) However, while the parties were in 
court, the district judge placed a phone call to Henderson in California, and he 
denied that Navarrete was with him at his (Henderson's) house when Romero was 
murdered. (6/25/10 Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.17; p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.6.) The district 
court concluded that "Henderson does not appear to be an alibi witness" and denied 
Navarrete's continuance request. (6/25/10 Tr., p.31, Ls.7-24.) 
At trial, after Navarrete testified that he was with Henderson at Henderson's 
home when Romero was murdered, the prosecutor asked him if he was present 
during the hearing when Henderson was asked questions by the district judge over 
speaker-phone. (Tr., p.1470, L.19 - p.1472, L.20.) The prosecutor then asked 
Navarrete, "and he doesn't agree with you, does he?" {Tr., p.1472, L.21.) 
Navarrete's attorney objected to the question and, outside the presence of the jury, 
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stated "confrontation" and "hearsay" as the bases for the objection and moved for a 
mistrial. (Tr., p.1472, L.22 - p.1476, L.15.) The prosecutor agreed that the question 
was improper, and said that, inasmuch as the question was not answered, he would 
withdraw it. (Tr., p.1477, L.25 - p.1478, L.2.) The court noted the question was 
being withdrawn by the prosecutor and denied Navarrete's motion for a mistrial. 
(Tr., p.1478, Ls.3-5.) The court asked Navarrete's counsel how he wanted to treat 
the improper question with regard to the jury, and counsel requested the jury be 
instructed that the "last question asked by the prosecutor is excluded," and that it be 
stricken. (Tr., p.1478, Ls.8-16.) When the jury returned to the courtroom, the district 
court instructed the jury that the prosecutor's last question "is stricken from the 
record, so you are not to give it any consideration." (Tr., p.1478, L.24 - p.1479, L.7.) 
The jury found Navarrete guilty of murder in the second degree and the 
firearm enhancement. (R., pp.176-177.) The district court sentenced Navarrete to 
indeterminate life with thirty years fixed (R., pp.182-185), from which Navarrete 
timely appealed (R., pp.186-189). 
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ISSUES 
Navarrete states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Navarrette's motion for a continuance?2 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Navarrette's motion 
for a mistrial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Navarrete failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion for a continuance of the trial? 
2. Has Navarrete failed to show that the district court erred by denying his motion 
for a mistrial? 
2 On appeal, Navarrete's counsel spells his client's name as "Navarrette." The state 




Navarrete Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Denied His Motion For A Continuance Of The Trial 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Navarrete's motion for a continuance because, as 
the court determined after questioning Henderson over speaker-phone in open 
court, Henderson was not able to provide Navarrete with the alibi that Navarrete was 
with Henderson at Henderson's house when the murder occurred.3 (6/25/10 Tr., 
p.30, L.6 - p.31, L.13.) On appeal, Navarrete asserts the district court abused its 
discretion and failed to reach its decision through the exercise of reason because: 
(1) the unsworn telephonic statements by Henderson to the court should be viewed 
with greater scrutiny than sworn testimony, and (2) Henderson had reasons for not 
wanting to get involved in the trial - he had recently moved to California with his 
family and he was engaged in drug rehabilitation. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Based 
on those contentions, Navarrete argues it was "very possible" Henderson would 
have become cooperative again if he had been subpoenaed and brought back to 
Idaho to testify at trial. (Id.) 
Application of the relevant law to the facts of this case, however, shows that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarrete's motion for a 
continuance because he failed to demonstrate Henderson could provide testimony 
3 At the June 25, 2010 hearing, when asked what Henderson had told defense 
counsel, counsel responded, "He's told us that Mr. Navarrete was with him at the 
time of the murder." (6/25/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-23.) 
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material to Navarrete's alibi defense and that his defense was prejudiced by the 
court's ruling. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21,981 P.2d 738,746 (1999); State 
v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). "Unless an 
appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a 
denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there 
was no abuse of discretion." Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981 P.2d 738, 746 (1999) 
(citing State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200,203,485 P.2d 144, 147 (1971)). See also State 
v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 762, 932 P.2d 881, 885 (1997); State v. Hudson, 129 
Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). 
"Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to 
be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within 
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128, 233 P.3d 52, 
59 (2010) (citing State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009)). 
C. Navarrete Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
In Denying His Motion To Continue His Jury Trial 
To prevail on his appellate claim that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion for a continuance, Navarrete must demonstrate that his 
substantial rights were prejudiced by having to proceed to trial as scheduled. Evans, 
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129 Idaho at 762, 932 P.2d at 885. "Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of 
latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the 
witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden 
counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons." State v. Carman, 
114 Idaho 791, 793, 760 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoted in State v. Cagle, 126 
Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
A defendant who moves for a continuance on the ground of absent witnesses 
is required to give the names of his proposed witnesses and show: what facts he 
intends to prove by them; that the witness is not absent by his procurement or 
consent; that the witness' testimony is material to his defense; that he has used 
diligence in attempting to procure his attendance at the trial; and a reasonable 
probability that he can and will procure the witness's attendance if the continuance is 
granted. State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho 716, 722-23, 864 P.2d 162, 168-69 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Mcclurg, 50 Idaho 762, 779, 300 P. 898 (1931), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937)). 
An abuse of discretion will not be found where the party requesting the continuance 
does not show these criteria. See State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 826, 693 P.2d 472 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (affirming trial court's denial of motion for continuance where defendant 
made no showing of a reasonable probability that he would procure the attendance 
of the witnesses if granted a continuance). Likewise, an appellant must show that 
the denial of the motion resulted in prejudice. State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 
927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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Here, Navarrete's attorney did not make any attempt, apart from his initial 
offer of proof, to show that Henderson would have provided testimony material to 
Navarrete's alibi defense. Navarrete's offer of proof quickly dissipated when the 
district court judge decided to call Henderson, who was in California, while the 
parties were in the courtroom. (6/25/10 Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.17.) That phone 
call resulted in the following colloquy between the judge and Henderson over 
speaker-phone: 
THE COURT: Mr. Henderson, I really appreciate you taking time to 
talk to me, and I know it's hard for you to do that. I need to ask you a 
question. 
Mr. Navarrete believes that you would say to the jury at the time 
of the alleged murder that you and Mr. Navarrete were together at your 
house. Are you going to be saying that? Would you say that to the 
jury, or not? 
MR. HENDERSON: Well, at this point, I'm not saying anything. So I 
don't want to be involved with this anymore. 
THE COURT: Okay, you've got to answer the question. You've got to 
answer the question. You've got to tell me, is that a true statement, or 
is it not a true statement, that you and Mr. Navarrete were together at 
his house at the time of the alleged murder - at your house? Excuse 
me. Let me ask you the question again, and answer yes or no. 
Were you and Mr. Navarrete together at your house at the time 
of the alleged murder? Can you answer that yes or no? 
MR. HENDERSON: No, we weren't. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. What did you say? 
MR. HENDERSON: I said no. 
THE COURT: And that would be your testimony before the jury? 
MR. HENDERSON: Yep. Yes, that is correct. 
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(6/25/10 Tr., p.28, L.1 - p.29, L.6.) After Henderson told the court that he and 
Navarrete were not together at Henderson's house at the time of the murder 
(6/25/10 Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.6), Navarrete opted not to ask Henderson any 
follow-up questions (6/25/10, p.29, Ls. 7-9). Having heard directly from Henderson 
about what his trial testimony would be, the court concluded that "Henderson does 
not appear to be an alibi witness" and denied Navarrete's request to continue in 
order to compel Henderson's presence. (6/25/10 Tr., p.31, Ls.7-24.) Further, the 
prosecutor told the court he had evidence supporting Henderson's assertion that 
Navarrete was not with him at the time of the murder - a recorded jail phone call 
from an inmate to Henderson about the time of the murder, in which Henderson said 
he had been home alone. The prosecutor told the court: 
This alibi witness, Mr. Henderson, I'll represent to the court that the 
state has a phone call from another person in the jail to Mr. Henderson 
at about noon on the day the homicide occurs, so this is right after the 
911 call. This is during the time that Mr. Navarrete has affirmatively 
represented that he's at Mr. Henderson's house. 
Mr. Henderson tells this other person in the jail that he's home 
alone; that there was a third male at the home earlier in the morning, 
but that he's there by himself. There's no mention of Mr. Navarrete. 
(6/25/10 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.11.) 
Navarrete argues on appeal that Henderson's telephonic statements to the 
court should be viewed with greater scrutiny than if he had provided sworn 
testimony, and because he did not want to return to Idaho to testify at trial, he may 
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not have been truthful when he said he could not provide Navarrete with an alibi.4 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Navarrete cites no authority to suggest that the trial 
judge was not entitled to fully consider Henderson's unsworn answers to her direct 
questions in order to determine whether he could provide alibi testimony for 
Navarrete. 
Navarrete's assertion that, if Henderson had been subpoenaed and came 
back to Idaho, once he got here, "it is very possible that [Henderson] would have 
become cooperative again" (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ), is wholly conjectural. The fact 
that it would have inconvenienced Henderson to return to Idaho does not mean, as 
Navarrete suggests, that Henderson was not truthful with the court when he denied 
Navarrete was with him at Henderson's house when the murder occurred just to 
4 Navarrete asserts he could have impeached Henderson if he had been allowed 
more time to subpoena him to trial. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Navarrete argues the 
jury could have "decided whether Mr. Navarrete had an alibi" based upon 
impeachment of Henderson. Navarrete appears to incorrectly suppose that such 
impeachment of Henderson could have been used as substantive proof of 
Navarrete's alibi. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Hayes, 144 
Idaho 574, 578, 165 P.3d 288, 292 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Marsh, 141 
Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004)): 
Substantive testimony may be distinguished from impeachment 
evidence as follows: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the 
purpose of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a 
proposition on which the determination of the tribunal is 
to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to 
discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his 
testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains 
why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
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avoid the inconvenience. It is just as likely, as the prosecutor suspected, that 
Henderson may have been reluctant to testify because he was "feeling some 
pressure from people in the jail and those associated with him" to say that Navarrete 
was at his house at the time of the murder when, in fact, he was not. (6/25/10 Tr., 
p.9, Ls.12-21.) 
Despite the superficial concerns Navarrete now voices about the reliability of 
Henderson's statements to the court, he has failed to show that the court abused its 
discretion by finding Henderson was not an alibi witness. See Munoz, 149 Idaho at 
128, 233 P.3d at 59 ("Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. Decisions regarding the credibility of 
witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be 
drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court."). Because the district court 
was told by Henderson several days before trial that he would not testify Navarrete 
was with him at his (Henderson's) house at the time of the murder, and because the 
state had a jail recording in which Henderson stated, at the time of the murder, he 
was at home "there by himself," the court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
Henderson was not an alibi witness. Stated differently, because Henderson's 
anticipated testimony was not material to Navarrete's alibi defense, but was instead 
contrary to it, the district court properly denied his motion to continue the trial. 
Waggoner, 124 Idaho at 722-23, 864 P.2d at 168-69. 
Because Navarrete has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court's 
finding that Henderson was not an alibi witness, he has necessarily also failed to 
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demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by having to proceed to trial 
as scheduled. Evans, 129 Idaho at 762, 932 P.2d at 885; see State v. Averett, 142 
Idaho 879, 889, 136 P.3d 350, 360 (Ct. App. 2006). Testimony by Henderson that 
he was alone at his own home during the time the murder took place elsewhere 
would not have assisted Navarrete's attempt to show he was not present when the 
murder occurred. Navarrete has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to continue the jury trial. 
11. 
Navarrete Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion For 
Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
As discussed, the district court denied Navarrete's motion to continue the jury 
trial after it placed an in-court telephone call to Henderson, who denied Navarrete 
was with him at Henderson's house when Irving Romero was murdered. At trial, 
after Navarrete testified that he went to Henderson's house at 225 Boise Avenue at 
about 10:45 a.m. on October 19, 2009, and stayed there until about 1 :15 p.m.5 (Tr., 
p.1470, L.21 - p.1471, L.25), the following colloquy took place during his cross-
examination: 
Q: Now [Henderson's] in California, right? 
A: Yes. 
5 It should be recalled that Romero was mortally shot in the back at about 11 :40 
a.m. on October 19, 2009. (Tr., p.400, L.11 - p.401, L.9; p.476, L.24 - p.477, L.1; p. 
555, L.8 - p.556, L.11.) 
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Q: You were present with all of us - well, with your counsel and 
myself and [the co-prosecutor] and the court staff, when there was a 
hearing about whether we'd have this trial now or move this trial so that 
you could try to get [Henderson] back from California; is that fair? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And in order to do that we had a speakerphone with 
[Henderson], right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And did the court have some questions with him about where he 
was on this particular day on the 19th of October? 
A: That the what? 
Q: The 19th of October? 
A. Did who have questions? 
Q. The court. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he doesn't agree with you, does he? 
[By Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. 
(Tr., p.1472, Ls.1-22 (emphasis added).) After the jury was excused, Navarrete's 
attorney explained: 
It's a hearsay confrontation objection concerning that. It's 
sufficient to say that [Henderson] refuses to come up here, but what 
[Henderson] said on the phone? I mean it's one thing to say that the 
man won't come up here; it is quite another to say that - the content of 
what he said to you. 
(Tr., p.1473, Ls.12-18.) The prosecutor agreed that the hearsay objection was well-
taken and told the court, "[i]f you want to instruct the jury to strike that comment, 
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that's fine" (Tr., p.1474, Ls.11-18), and he would "move to a different subject" (Tr., 
p.1474, Ls.23-24). The prosecutor also explained that he had not intended to ask 
Navarrete exactly what Henderson said. (Tr., p.1474, Ls.14-16.) Navarrete's 
attorney moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's last question to Navarrete. 
(Tr., p.1476, Ls.8-17.) The prosecutor then withdrew his question, and pointed out 
that Navarrete had not answered it. (Tr., p.1477, L.25 - p.1478, L.2.) The district 
court denied Navarrete's motion for a mistrial, and asked Navarrete's attorney how 
he wanted to treat the improper question. (Tr., p.1478, Ls.3-10.) Counsel 
responded, "I want you to say the last question asked by the prosecutor is excluded" 
(Tr., p.1478, Ls.11-12), and: 
Stricken from the record and they're not to consider it. It's a 
motion to strike, I suppose. That's the appropriate way. 
(Tr., p.1478, Ls.14-16.) 
When the jury re-entered the courtroom, the judge instructed it as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the last question asked by the 
prosecutor before I excused you from the courtroom you are to - that 
question is stricken from the record, so you are not to give it any 
consideration. Thank you. 
(Tr., p.1479, Ls.3-8.) The prosecutor then embarked on a different line of 
questioning. (Tr., p.1479, Ls.11-14.) 
On appeal, Navarrete contends the district court erred in denying his motion 
for a mistrial, claiming, "because the improper questioning went to the heart of Mr. 
Navarrette's defense - his alibi, the corrective instruction was insufficient and a 
mistrial should have been granted." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) However, applying the 
14 
appropriate standards to the facts of this case, Navarrete has failed to establish 
reversible error in the district court's decision to deny his motion for a mistrial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial, the question 
on appeal is not whether the district court reasonably exercised its discretion in light 
of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. State v. Barcella, 135 
Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). The question is "whether the 
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been 
denied in a criminal case, the abuse of discretion standard is a misnomer." ~ The 
district court's "refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error." !Q. Therefore, a conviction will 
not be set aside for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having 
changed the results of the trial. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367-368, 972 P.2d 
737, 7 45-7 46 (Ct. App. 1998). The test for harmless error is whether the appellate 
court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not 
have been different absent the improper testimony. J.g_. at 368, 972 P.2d at 746. 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Navarrete's Motion for A Mistrial 
In the context of the entire record, the prosecutor's question does not amount 
to reversible error, but is a defect that has little, if any, likelihood of having changed 
the result of the trial. 
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The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the 
declaration of a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 269, 869 P.2d 
583, 586 (Ct. App. 1994). Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides "[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded." Therefore, a new trial is unnecessary if the error was harmless. State 
v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 593, 38 P.3d 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2001). "The test for 
harmless error ... is whether a reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the 
challenged evidence." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 
(1998); State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 300, 32 P.3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2001). In 
addition, it is well established that where improper testimony is introduced into a trial 
and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is 
ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely. See State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Boothe, 103 
Idaho 187, 192, 646 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1982). No less an authority than the 
United States Supreme Court has proclaimed: 
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an 
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the 
court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the 
evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant. 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987). Therefore, the presumption is that the 
jury in Navarrete's case followed the district court's instruction to disregard the 
improper question when she struck it from the record. Navarrete bears the burden 
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of demonstrating an overwhelming probability that the jury would not be able to 
follow the district court's instruction to ignore the question, and that such probability 
was likely devastating to Navarrete's defense. 
Navarrete has failed to meet his burden on appeal. The prosecutor's 
question went unanswered, so there was no improper testimony heard by the jury. 
The district court struck the question from the record and instructed the jury "not to 
give it any consideration." (Tr., p.1479, Ls.3-7.) Moreover, the court instructed the 
jury in its preliminary instructions: 
In determining the facts you may consider only the evidence 
admitted during the trial. ... 
. . . At times during the trial an objection may be made to 
question asked a witness or to a witness's answer or to an exhibit. ... 
If I sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may 
not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not 
attempt to guess what the answer might have been or the exhibit 
would have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular 
statement or exhibit, you should put it out of your mind and not refer to 
it or rely on it in your later deliberations. 
(Tr., p.362, L.18 - p.363, L.14; see R., p.154 (Jury Instr. No. 5).) The court's 
instruction to the jury, coupled with the fact that the question was unanswered and 
the prosecutor pursued a new line of questioning upon the jury's return, was 
sufficient to safeguard against any consideration of the improper question. On 
appeal, the court "presume[s] that a jury obeyed the trial court's instructions to 
disregard an improper question and to avoid speculation as to what the witness 
might have answered if permitted to do so." State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 639, 
619 P.2d 787, 794 (1980) (citations omitted). Navarrete has failed to show in any 
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way that the jury would be unable to follow the instruction not to consider the 
unanswered question 
Furthermore, in viewing the entire record as a whole, there is no indication 
that the prosecutor's question would have affected the guilty verdict; the jury would 
have returned the same guilty verdict had it not heard the question. A review of the 
trial record shows the evidence demonstrating Navarrete's guilt was, to say the 
least, overwhelming. 
Elizabeth Chinea ("Liz'') and Jennifer Israel testified that they were present at 
the trailer and personally saw Navarrete shoot Irving Romero in the back. (Tr., 
p.676, L.13 - p.677, L.25; 753, L.3 - p.754, L.8.) Holly Peterson testified that she 
was standing in the driveway of her mobile home park trailer with Liz and saw 
Navarrete ("Wedo") pushing Romero out the front door of the mobile home; when 
Romero jumped off the porch, she turned around and heard a gunshot go off, then 
ran down the street with Liz to a neighbor's house. (Tr., p.927, L.14 - p.929, L.25.) 
Jessie Salinas testified that he, Mike Stolp, and Navarrete drove to Holly 
Peterson's Garden City trailer on October 19, 2009, and upon arrival, Stolp and 
Navarrete went to the back room of the trailer where Romero was lying in bed. (Tr., 
p.1507, L.8- p.1508, L.22.) Salinas explained that after he went back outside and 
talked to Liz and Holly in the driveway for a few minutes, he walked toward the front 
door, but when he got to the bottom of the steps (Tr., p.1509, L.6 - p.1510, L.8), 
-- the main door slammed open and that screen door comes open and 
Irving runs out and hits me with his shoulder. And I kind of step back 
and I look at him. And when I look at him I heard a gunshot. 
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(Tr., p.1510, Ls.11-15.) Salinas further testified that Stolp followed Romero out the 
front door, but he could not see inside the trailer to be able to see who was behind 
Stolp. (Tr., p.1511, Ls.12-18.) When the gunshot went off, Salinas saw Stolp 
standing on the edge of the stairs with his hands in the air. (Tr., p.1512, Ls.8-16.) 
The three - Navarrete, Stolp, and Salinas - drove together in Stolp's truck to 
Salinas's mother's house, and Navarrete and Stolp left that house together in Stolp's 
Camara because his truck was running out of gas. (Tr., p.1512, L.20-p.1513, L.14; 
p.1583, L.4 - p.1584, L.18.) 
Stolp testified that, just before the shooting, he was walking in front of 
Romero as they were leaving the trailer with Navarrete behind Romero, and when 
Stolp got to the front door, Romero pushed him into the doorjamb and a shot 
simultaneously went off, startling Stolp and causing him to put his hands in the air. 
(Tr., p.1578, L.14 - p.1579, L.7; p.1581, Ls.3-23.) When Stolp looked around, 
Navarrete was still inside the trailer. (Tr., p.1582, Ls. 8-10.) 
Janet Wallace, a sometimes intimate friend of Navarrete's (Tr., p.872, L.22 -
p.873, L.21 ), testified that Navarrete admitted to her that he shot Romero because 
Romero was "passing around pictures on the phone," and was "talking shit about 
him leaving messages and that his main reason was because he called him a punk 
bitch" (Tr., p.883, Ls.16-25). 
Dan Brown, a friend who grew up with Navarrete in Parma (Tr., p.825, L.4 -
p.826, L.2), testified that Navarrete called him about 11 :00 or 11 :30 (on Monday, 
October 19, 2009) and asked him to go into Navarrete's garage and "push some 
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stuff around so we can fit two cars in there, and turn on the TV and watch the news 
and scanner" (Tr., p.828, L.12 - p.829, L.24). When Navarrete arrived at his house 
about ten minutes later (in a Camaro and with a young male), he threw a pistol onto 
his bed, said it kept jamming, and asked Brown if he could clean it for him. (Tr., 
p.832, L.6 - p.833, L.19.) As Brown was washing the pistol in the bathroom, 
Navarrete called him back into the bedroom where the TV was showing a breaking 
story about a shooting in Garden City. (Tr., p.833, L.21 - p.834, L.13.) Brown 
asked Navarrete if he knew what he had done, and if he knew what he had gotten 
himself into, and Navarrete said "no." (Tr., p.836, L.17- p.837, L.6.) Because 
Brown's "gut told [him] that [Navarrete] had did [sic] something with it," he asked 
Navarrete if he knew "how to take care of [the pistol] so it couldn't be traced back to 
him." (Tr., p.837, Ls.11-15.) When Navarrete responded "no," Brown "took a 
screwdriver, run [sic] it down the barrel, try messing [sic] up the rifling." (Tr., p.837, 
Ls.17-23.) Brown loaded several tote bags of Navarrete's belongings into Brown's 
vehicle (a van), which they agreed would be kept at Brown's house until Navarrete 
picked them up after he was ready to go to Las Vegas. (Tr., p.839, Ls.5-18.) As 
Brown shook Navarrete's hand when he walked out of the house, Navarrete told 
Brown, "I got him," which Brown thought related to the news story he had seen. (Tr., 
p.839, L.21 - p.840, L.3.) 
On his way home, Brown noticed one of the tote bags had fallen onto the floor 
of his van and opened up, exposing the pistol. (Tr., p.840, Ls.7-10.) Once he was 
home, Brown placed the pistol back into the tote bag, and took all four or five of the 
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tote bags into his home. (Tr., p.840, L.20 - p.841, L.15.) Navarrete later contacted 
Brown and told him he would pick up his belongings on Tuesday morning (October 
20, 2009), but after he failed to show up, Brown removed the pistol out of one of the 
tote bags, and took it to his work and placed it in a hole ("like a ground squirrel hole") 
in the back of the gravel pit. (Tr., p.845, L.14 - p.846, L.23.) On Wednesday, 
October 21, 2009, detectives with the Garden City Police Department contacted 
Brown, who led them to the pistol at the gravel pit. (Tr., p.1038, L.13 - p.1045, 
L.16.) According to Stuart Jacobson, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services, a spent bullet shell casing found lying on the ground next to the 
trailer steps was fired by the same pistol that Navarrete gave to Brown, and which 
was recovered from the gravel pit. (Tr., p.410, Ls.17-21; p.1041, L.2- p.1055, L.21; 
p.1236, L.11-p.1240, L.3; p.1274, Ls.19-24; p.1343, L.25-p.1344, L.9.) 
In sum, the evidence presented at trial showing Navarrete's guilt was 
mountainous - Elizabeth Chinea and Jennifer Israel saw Navarrete shoot Romero in 
the back; Holly Peterson, Jessie Salinas, and Mike Stolp testified that, although they 
did not see the gun actually fire, Navarrete was not only present at the scene, but 
was either seen right behind Romero when he was shot in the back, or (if not seen) 
was still in the trailer at the time; Navarrete admitted to Janet Wallace and Dan 
Brown that he shot Romero; and, the bullet shell casing found at the scene was fired 
from the pistol Navarrete gave to Brown and asked him to clean after the shooting. 
Viewed retrospectively, the single unanswered question by the prosecutor does not 
constitute reversible error. Pecor, 132 Idaho at 367-368, 972 P.2d at 745-746. 
21 
Based on the amount of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this Court can 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of Navarrete's trial would not 
have been different absent the improper question. !,Q. at 368, 972 P.2d at 746. The 
district court correctly denied Navarrete's motion for a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's denial of 
Navarrete's motion for a continuance of his jury trial and his motion for mistrial on 
murder in the second degree and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime. 
DATED this 12th day of October, 2011. 
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